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Why Do Restaurant Firms Initiate Dividends? 
 
Abstract 
 The U.S .restaurant industry has experienced strong growth since 1970 (National 
Restaurant Association, 2012).  Publicly traded restaurant firms tend to initiate dividends soon 
after they go public, quite often even in the same year.  This study tests hypotheses based upon 
four dividend initiation theories:  signaling, life-cycle, agency costs and catering.    The results 
reveal that only the signaling theory is significant.  Since most restaurant firms initiate dividends 
at the growth stage, they tend to have little free cash, flow, high investment opportunities, and 
low dividend premiums (which are less favorable to investors).  
 






Why Do Restaurant Firms Initiate Dividends? 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine why publicly traded restaurant firms in the U.S. 
initiate dividends.  While Canina et al. (2001) and Sheel and Zhong (2005) examined dividend 
initiation, other hospitality research has focused on the firm characteristics of dividend changes.  
One of the reasons this topic is important is due to the strong growth of the restaurant industry.  
The U.S. restaurant industry has experienced a sales increase of more than 700% over the past 
thirty years.  Food industry sales were $42.8 billion in 1970; by 2012, they had increased to an 
estimated $632 billion (National Restaurant Association, 2012).  Between 1990 and 2007, the 
restaurant industry experienced sixteen years of consecutive growth (Hua & Templeton, 2010). 
Findings in the general finance literature indicate that high-growth firms tend to have low 
dividend payout ratios because they need to reinvest internally generated funds (Palepu et al., 
2000).    The restaurant industry has a number of high-growth firms similar to other industries.  
However, the majority of restaurant firms initiate dividends within a few years of their initial 
public offering (IPO).  This may because restaurant firms may be less likely to reinvest in fixed 
assets like hotel firms typically do and pay out more earnings as dividends (Dalbor & Upneja, 
2007).  Franchising is quite common in the restaurant industry as it requires fewer resources for 
rapid growth.  There is also some evidence that restaurant firms that franchise produce better 
financial results than firms that maintain all company-owned outlets (Hsu & Jang, 2009). 
This study investigates firm characteristics around the time of dividend initiation by U.S. 
restaurant firms and identifies the determinants of dividend initiation.  While previous studies 
mainly compare dividend-paying firms with non-dividend-paying firms, this study examines the 
difference between dividend-initiating firms and non-initiating firms in the restaurant industry. 
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Therefore, this study makes a number of potential contributions to the literature.  First, we 
address dividend initiation from both contemporaneous and expectation perspectives, offering a 
consistent view of determinants of dividend initiation.  Second, we test four predominant 
alternative hypotheses in the restaurant industry and show consistently that signaling is uniquely 
supported.  Third, we focus on the restaurant industry and provided industry specific findings of 
determinants of dividend initiation for the first time.  And lastly, we find it appears that the 
clientele theory is likely a subset of the signaling theory and future research is needed to further 
understand dividend initiation. 
This paper is organized in the following manner.  The next section will discuss the relevant 
literature on dividend initiation and develop hypotheses to be tested.  Then the methodology 
section spells out the testing frameworks, variables of interest and study sample.  The next 
section will discuss the results, followed by a sensitivity test section.  The paper then draws 
conclusions and provides recommendations for further research. 
Literature Review 
Dividend policies tend to differ across industries.  While firms in the service industry with 
relatively stable cash flows tend to pay a constant amount per share, technology firms with 
uncertain cash flows prefer not to pay any dividends at all (Cohen & Yagil, 2010).  Furthermore, 
when a large percentage of firms in an industry pay dividends, the industry’s overall debt rating 
tends to be better and individual firms tend to be larger and less risky.  For example, on average, 
83% of firms in the finance industry pay dividends while only 57% of those in the service 
industry do (Cohen & Yagil, 2010).  According to a survey on CFO dividend decisions, 
projected cash flows are the most important factor in dividend policy (Cohen & Yagil, 2010).  In 
the lodging industry, the dividend payout ratio was 7.3% from 1976 to 1995 (Canina, et al., 
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2001).  This may be due to the high volatility of income, high levels of debt, cyclical market 
movements and the fixed asset intensity of the lodging business.  Similarly, the dividend payout 
ratio in the restaurant industry averaged 4.4% for 2002 through 2004 (Dalbor & Upneja, 2007).  
Kim and Gu (2009) observe the dividend policies of all three hospitality industries (restaurants, 
hotels and casino hotels) in the year 2005.  While 28 firms were in the dividend-paying group, 
the other 41 firms were classified as non-dividend-paying.  Since the number of dividend payers 
declined in the late 1990s and the characteristics of firms came to more greatly resemble those of 
firms that never paid dividends (Fama & French, 2001), combined with the cash hoarding 
behavior of publicly traded firms recently (Bates et al. 2009), it appears that this trend may 
continue and that hospitality firms might be less likely to pay out dividends in the 21st century.        
An understanding of the potential reasons for the decline in dividend payments is helpful 
before finding the motivation of dividend initiation.   The dividend decline after 1978 was due to 
an explosion in the number of newly listed firms (hereafter, new lists) and the changing 
characteristics of firms.  Before 1978, new lists tended to be more profitable than seasoned firms.  
While the earnings of new lists averaged 17.79% of book equity in 1973–77, the earnings of new 
lists averaged only 2.07% of book equity in 1993-98.  As the profitability of new lists declined, 
the percentage of new lists that paid dividends also declined.  Smaller firms tended to pay fewer 
dividends after 1978. 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) test declining dividend theories and find that the catering theory 
explained the disappearance of dividends.  The catering theory is based on the idea that investor 
demand can create a gap between the stock prices of payers and nonpayers in an inefficient stock 
market.  Managers rationally cater to demand by paying dividends to dividend-paying shares at a 
premium and not paying to discounted dividend payers. 
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There is mixed evidence about measuring the information impact of dividend changes 
(Brealey et al., 2008).  Some researchers have found that dividend changes have no power to 
predict future earnings (Bulan et al., 2007).  However, Healy and Palepu (1988) show that at 
dividend initiation, earnings rose 43% in the year a dividend was paid, while an abnormal stock 
price jumped 4% at the dividend initiation announcement.  The same positive impact of dividend 
initiation was observed in the hospitality industry.  When lodging firms announced a cash 
dividend for the first time, their stock prices on average rose by 1–3% (Canina, 2001; Sheel & 
Zhong, 2005).  Canina et al. (2001) explore the reasons for this price movement and suggested 
that the information asymmetry between managers and investors provided an opportunity for 
managers to use cash dividends as a signaling mechanism to transmit information to investors. 
Therefore, it is likely that dividend initiation in the lodging industry implies managerial 
confidence in future firm financial performance.  In other words, managers are more likely to 
initiate dividends if they expect to generate more profits and enjoy greater financial flexibility in 
the future.  However, Benartzi et al. (1997) finds that changes in dividends do not have 
information about future earning changes.   
There are other reasons for dividend initiation as reported by Kale et al. (2011).  They find 
that a firm initiated dividends when the supply of operating cash flows is greater than the cash 
needs.  Firms like to attract better-informed institutional investors; thus, one potential signal of 
their higher quality is a dividend payment.  Their results match the dividend signaling model 
which shows the negative relationship between the probability of dividend initiation and both the 
beta of firm assets and residual standard deviation of stock returns. 
Dividend initiation announcements can negatively impact other firms within the same 
industry as found by (Kohers, 1999).  Industry responses depend on industry homogeneity, the 
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announcing firm’s abnormal return and its size.  The volatility tends to increase around dividend 
announcements for a low information environment which has higher investor uncertainty 
surrounding firms (Mitra & Owers, 1995).  When managers signal future performance with 
dividend increases (or initiation), they increase their firm’s ownership (shareholders) because of 
the dividends.  Otherwise the value of share will fall by more than the amount of dividend.  Born 
(1988) reports that insider ownership positions are positively related to market responses of 
dividend initiation announcements. When there is no transaction cost for trading in shares in a 
perfect market, dividend policy becomes value irrelevant (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). 
Taxation may have an impact on dividend changes.  When Congress enacted the cuts in 
dividend and capital gain tax rates in 2003, only insiders among individual investors rebalanced 
their portfolios (Blouin, Raedy & Shackelford, 2011).  When dividend and capital gain tax cuts 
are made permanent, dividend payments rise immediately.  However, if those tax cuts are 
temporary, firms distribute large dividends right after the temporary dividend tax cut (Gourio & 
Miao, 2011; Brav et al., 2008).  Since this study looks at dividend initiation, we won’t test the 
impact of tax cut on dividend changes.  Considering the inconsistent results from previous 
studies on dividend initiation and the yet-to-be tested signaling hypothesis in the restaurant 
industry, we offer the following research hypothesis: 
H1A: Dividend initiation is likely to be positively related to future profitability and 
liquidity. 
Dividend initiations are dependent on a firm’s life cycle.  Dividend initiators are firms that 
have reached the mature stage of their life cycles.  While dividends are paid by mature and 
established firms, young firms have abundant investment opportunities and limited resources 
(DeAngelo et al., 2006).  When firms become mature and have diminished investment 
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opportunities, they tend to increase their cash payouts (Grullon et al., 2002).  Firms change 
dividends through time according to their investment opportunity sets (Denis & Osobov, 2008).  
Bulan et al. (2007) find that the mature firm initiates dividends.  In addition, initiators tend to be 
larger and more profitable, have greater cash reserves, and have fewer growth opportunities than 
non-initiators.  High-growth firms are not likely to pay dividends due to costly external financing 
(Holder et al., 1998).  Therefore, we have the following research hypothesis: 
H2A: Dividend initiation is likely to be negatively related to the growth rate and the 
investment opportunity; but positively related to firm size. 
For those firms with a high rate of free cash flow but few profitable investment opportunities, 
stockholders prefer a dividend policy with high payouts to deter managers from spending free 
cash flows on value-decreasing projects or management perks (Palepu et al., 2000).  Particularly 
after 2000, investors have preferred high payout growth firms because there appears to be fewer 
agency problems when these firms paid high dividends (Sung et al., 2006).  Since U.S. casino 
firms have positive investment opportunities and high annual sales revenue growth rates, they are 
less likely to payout dividends (Kim & Gu, 2009).  Therefore, we offer the following research 
hypothesis: 
H3A: Dividend initiation is likely to be positively related to free cash flow and negatively 
related to investment opportunities. 
Finally, dividend initiation can rely on investor sentiment.  Catering theory (Baker & 
Wurgler, 2004) suggests that managers make their dividend decisions based on whether they 
expect a dividend premium for dividend payers versus non-dividend payers.  This dividend 
premium is the difference between the logs of the dividend payers’ and nonpayers’ average 
market-to-book ratios (Baker & Wurgler, 2004).  In other words, these managers tend to pay 
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dividends when they expect a valuation premium on dividend payers; they will probably not pay 
dividends if such a valuation premium is not expected or does not exist.  Bulan et al. (2007) find 
that the higher the dividend premium, the more likely a dividend payment will be initiated.  
When the dividend premium is higher, the abnormal returns around initiations are also higher.  
Ferris et al. (2009) also reported that the dividend premium is positively related to dividend 
payment in twenty-three countries.  IPO firms prefer dividends to repurchases when investor 
demand for dividends is high as indicated by their willingness to offer higher dividend premiums 
(Jain, Shekhar & Torbey, 2009).  However, while the dividend premium is largely positive in 
those countries, the number of dividend payers has dropped (Denis & Osobov 2008). This may 
be due to fewer dividend initiations by newly listed firms.  Therefore, we offer a fourth research 
hypothesis: 
H4A: Dividend initiation is likely to be positively related to dividend premium. 
However, rather than paying out dividends, companies can also buy back their outstanding 
shares to achieve the goal of returning cash to shareholders.  Stock repurchases can be done in 
several different ways: 1) announcements in the open market; 2) use of a tender offer (20% 
above current market value); 3) employment of a Dutch auction; and/or 4) negotiation with 
major shareholders (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008).  While dividend payouts are more likely to 
be continuous events with high future earnings, share repurchases tend to be one-time events due 
to present undervaluation (Dittmar, 2000) and often lack long-term commitment (Brealey, Myers 
& Allen, 2008).  A dividend reduction can be balanced by share repurchases.  In addition, when 
cash dividends are replaced by share repurchases, shareholder’s wealth does not change (Brealey, 
Myers & Allen, 2008).   In order to distribute cash from corporations to shareholders, a majority 
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of a firm’s shareholders supports dividend payouts for small contributions and stock repurchases 
for large distribution (Brennan & Thakor, 1990).   
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) report that institutions prefer dividend paying firms even after 
controlling size, risk, market-to-book ratio and a host of other variables.  However, institutions 
do not have a preference for firms that pay a high dividend.  Institutions tend to prefer low-
dividend stocks to high dividend stocks. 
Previous hospitality studies have explored other determinants of dividend policies.  While 
total debt and dividend payout have been found to be negatively related, firm size and dividend 
payout are positively related in the restaurant industry (Dalbor & Upneja, 2007).  In addition, 
more highly leveraged firms tend to pay lower dividends due to higher bankruptcy risk and the 
cost of debt capital (Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006).  Furthermore, firms with greater sales are likely 
to have lower bankruptcy risk and pay out higher dividends (Dickens et al., 2003).  Finally, 
earnings variability has been found to be negatively related to dividend payout (Amidu & Abor, 
2006).  It appears that when firms have stable earnings, they pay a higher percentage of earnings 
as dividends.   
Methodology 
The literature suggests four alternative explanations for a firm’s decision to initiate dividends 
within a financial framework: 1) Signaling; 2) Life cycle; 3) Agency costs; and 4) Catering.  In 
this study, we examine which hypothesis explains dividend initiations for publicly traded 
restaurant firms.  We start from logit regressions that relate dividend initiations to firm 
characteristics that proxy for the aforementioned alternative hypotheses within a 
contemporaneous framework.  This approach attempts to identify whether there are embedded 
correlations between firm financial characteristics and dividend initiation.  In other words, we 
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seek to answer the following question:  What financial characteristics would we expect 
restaurant firms to exhibit while initiating dividends?  Next, we employ an expectation 
framework to directly test which hypothesis explains the phenomenon of restaurant dividend 
initiation.  We argue that our expectation framework takes a different and probably better 
perspective relative to the indirect tests employed by many prior studies, which infer from 
market reactions to dividend announcements whether new and positive information has been 
released (by estimating abnormal returns) and then examine whether these market reactions are 
consistent with after-dividend firm financial characteristics changes.  Depending on whether 
changes in these financial characteristics are consistent with market reactions to dividend 
initiations or pre-dividend characteristics, these studies draw a conclusion about whether a 
certain hypothesis has been supported or not.  However, this type of research design is 
questionable because, strictly speaking, it is intended to answer the question of whether 
management has correctly decided whether to initiate a dividend or not instead of which 
variables determine the managerial dividend initiation decision.   
Based on the principal hypothesis and empirical evidence from Lintner (1956), management 
makes dividend initiation decisions based on expectations of their firms’ future earnings, which 
are arguably determined by future changes in a firm’s financial characteristics.  Therefore, our 
explanatory variables, taking both contemporaneous and forward-looking forms, follow Baker 
and Wurgler (2004), Bulan et al. (2007), Grullon et al. (2002), Healy and Palepu (1988), and 
Kim and Gu (2009), and are motivated by the aforementioned four hypotheses.   
The variables used (Variable abbreviations, relevant Compustat annual data items, and 
explanations in parentheses) are as follows: 
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1. Return on Assets (ROA = ni/at, net income divided by total assets), a profitability 
measure commonly employed in previous studies is motivated by signaling theory.  If 
a firm considers itself more profitable both for now and in years to come, it is more 
likely the firm will pay out dividends to signal investors that the firm has more 
internal funds (Myers & Majluf, 1984), stable operating cash flows, and lower 
probability of business failure (Dickens et al., 2003).  A significantly positive test 
result on ROA both in contemporaneous and expectation frameworks would suggest 
dividend initiation is consistent with signaling theory. 
2. Investment Opportunity (InvestOpp = (csho*prcc_f)/seq, common shares 
outstanding*share price at the end of a fiscal year over book value of total equity).  
Governed by the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), firms that have more 
investment opportunities should retain more earnings to avoid costly external 
financing.  Therefore, a negative relationship between investment opportunities and 
dividend initiation is consistent with the pecking order theory.  However, the measure 
of investment opportunity also indicates possible strong future earnings power (Fama 
& French, 1993); thus, according to the signaling theory, a positive relationship can 
be observed between investment opportunity and dividend initiation. 
3. Growth Rate (Growth rate = (revtt-revtt-1)/revtt-1, the relative change in total sales 
from time t-1 to t). Previous studies (e.g., Amidu & Abor, 2006; Rozeff, 1982) 
hypothesized a negative relationship between firm growth rate and dividend payouts 
because growing firms are more likely to use internal funds to finance growth, which 
is also consistent with the pecking order theory.  
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4. Liquidity (Liquidity = act/lct, current assets divided by current liabilities). Similar to 
free cash flow, liquidity is viewed as an indication of whether sufficient funds are 
available for dividend payouts and the firm is able to pay out (Amidu & Abor, 2006).  
In particular, if liquidity is found to be positively correlated to dividend initiation in 
an expectation framework, in other words, if liquidity in the year after dividend 
initiation is positively correlated with dividend initiation, then we find supports for 
signaling because those firms that form the right expectation about their stronger 
future financial position are more likely to initiate dividends.  
5. Free Cash Flow (FCF = ch/at, cash divided by total assets). Inclusion of FCF is 
motivated by agency theory, considering that firms with large free cash flows can use 
dividend payouts to reduce agency costs associated with overinvestment and increase 
the firm’s market value (Jensen, 1986). In addition, a positive correlation between 
free cash flow and dividend initiation is consistent with pecking order theory, because 
when a firm has more cash, it is more capable of paying out dividends from these 
internal funds. 
6. Size (Size=ln(at), natural logarithm of total assets). Signaling and life cycle theories 
argue for the opposite direction in terms of the relationship between firm size and 
dividend payout.  The signaling theory argues that firms that start to pay out 
dividends can be relatively smaller in the dividend-initiating year because smaller 
firms have a stronger incentive to initiate dividends.  This sends a signal to investors 
of their potential financial success and managerial confidence, thus lowering their 
cost of capital.  In the firm life cycle theory, more mature firms, which tend to be 
bigger in size, will have easier access to capital markets, thus reducing their needs for 
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internal financing and allowing for dividend payout (e.g.,  Fama & French, 2001; 
Zeng, 2003; Kim & Gu, 2009). 
7. Debt Ratio (Debt ratio = lt/at, total liabilities divided by total assets).  Due to higher 
external financing costs and default risk, heavily leveraged firms are more 
constrained financially and less likely to pay out dividends (e.g., Mancinelli & Ozkan, 
2006; Jensen et al., 1992). 
8. Capital Expenditure (Capex = capx/at, capital expenditure divided by total assets).  If 
capital expenditure creates assets that can be used as collateral, capital expenditure 
could increase debt capacity and reduce demand for cash (Bates et al., 1999), thus 
equipping firms with internal funds needed to pay out dividends, likely motivated by 
pecking order theory. In addition, increases in capital expenditures also suggest that 
firms are catering to growing demand and signaling a stronger financial future. 
Consequently, we expect capital expenditures to be positively correlated with 
dividend initiation within the expectation framework and negatively associated with 
dividend initiation within the contemporaneous framework. 
9. Earnings Coefficient of Variation (ECV = the standard deviation of niq/the mean of 
niq, coefficient of variation of quarterly net income).  Previous empirical evidence 
suggests that ECV tends to be negatively associated with the likelihood of dividend 
payouts because of firms’ precautionary motives when facing uncertain earning 
streams (Amidu & Abor, 2006; Jensen et al., 1992; Opler et al., 1999).  Although 
dividend initiating firms do not subsequently increase their firm’s earnings, earnings 
volatility becomes significantly lower after the dividend initiation announcement (Dyl 
& Weigand, 1998).    
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10. Stock Repurchase (Repurchase = 1, if there is an increase in treasury stock, 0, 
otherwise). Stock repurchase is generally considered to be an alternative to dividend 
payouts; thus, a negative correlation is expected. 
11. Dividend Premium (DV Premium = the logs of the average market-to-book ratios of 
dividend payers and non-payers, following Baker and Wurgler [2004]). The catering 
theory of dividends proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004) suggests that investor 
sentiment could be a reason for dividend initiation. It appears that investors prefer 
dividend-paying firms in certain periods of time to non-paying firms. When arbitrage 
fails to correct the “irrational” preference, certain firms in the preferred category may 
find it optimal to initiate dividends.  Further, Bulan et al. (2007) showed a 
significantly positive relationship between the dividend premium and dividend 
initiation.  When the dividend premium is high, mature firms tend to initiate 
dividends. 
12. Fama-French’s three factors (Market, SMB, HML beta, from the Fama-French data 
library website, referring to market premium, small-minus-big and high-minus-low, 
respectively).  We control for the overall market condition by including Fama-
French’s three factors.  Bulan et al. (2007) shows that dividend initiators tend to be 
similar to value firms such as high book-to-market firms rather than to growth firms.  
Our results are not sensitive to alternatively controlling for Fama-French’s three-
factor loadings (details are covered in the sensitivity test section) (Fama & French, 
1993). 
13. Dividend Initiation (DV Initiation = 1, if a firm initiates cash dividend payment after 
a firm’s initial public offering in a given year; 0, otherwise).  DV Initiation is used as 
 the dependent variable in this study and captures the observations from a 
dividend initiation.   
With variables of interest in hand, the two test frameworks are laid out below.  
The contemporaneous framework:
Where logit(.) symbolizes the logit function form. 
variables discussed above and  
And, the expectation framework:
Where logit(.) symbolizes the logit function form.  
variables discussed above and 
indicate year t and year t+1, respectively.  
We use the restaurant industry (SIC 5812) for data analysis.  First, using CRSP 
collect dividend initiation restaurant firms in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during the period 
1971–2010.  We then identify the dividend
sample of non-dividend initiators, which
the contemporaneous framework, we consider the dividend
purposes.  Under the expectation framework, we consider the year following the dividend
initiating year for forward financial
dependent variable data collection purposes.  Our expectation framework is restricted to one year 
after dividend initiation because management is not likely to have accurate expectations about 
their firms’ financial characteristics in a longer time window.  In practice, publicly traded 
 
 
 is a vector of relevant independent 
is the relevant parameter vector. The subscript t indicates year t.
 
 
 is a vector of relevant independent 
is the relevant parameter vector. The subscript t and t+1 
 
-initiating year. Based on this, we select the control 
 have never paid a cash dividend since their IPO.
-initiating year for data collection 










companies most often provide managerial earnings guidance within a one-year-into-the-future 
time frame at most.  Very rarely, if at all, will a company provide guidance in a longer timeframe 
due to likely reliability concerns.  Therefore, establishing an expectation framework with a time 
window longer than one year would likely result in misleading statistical results.  Our final 
samples consist of 157 unique cash dividend initiators and 153 unique non-initiators.  Financial 
information for independent variables is collected from the Annual COMPUSTAT Industrials 
database. 
Results 
We identify 157 unique cash dividend initiations in the restaurant industry between 1971 and 
2010 (Figure 1).  Echoing Fama and French (2001), the restaurant industry does also appear to 
exhibit a disappearing cash dividend trend.   However, the pattern observed in Figure 1 also 
shows quite some correlation with the overall economic environment.  For example, we observe 
the relatively lower levels of dividend initiations in 1972–1974, 1980–1981, 1984–1986, 1989, 
1992, 2001 and 2008–2010, which correspond to the well-known economic downturns.  
Moreover, we observe the relatively higher levels of dividend initiations in 1976, 1983, 1988, 
1995, and 2004, which correspond to economic upswing periods.  Note the peak levels of 
dividend-initiating years preceding the peak years of the macro economy, indicating that 
restaurant firms might be able to foresee, at least to some degree, future economic evolvement, 
thus making their dividend decisions accordingly.  This likely predictability might stem from 
direct and frequent customer contact, which provides opportunities for perceiving, sometimes 
even sensitive, changes in consumer spending behavior.   
**Please insert Figure 1 here** 
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Sample summary statistics are reported in Table 1 based on the dividend-initiating year.  
Panel A includes both dividend initiators and non-initiators.  It appears that the restaurant 
industry is at high risk, as indicated by wide dispersions in almost every variable.  In particular, 
the mean profitability measure of ROA of -19% and its associated standard deviation of 162% 
offer a strong sign of risk flavor.  Panels B and C provide summary information for non-initiators 
and initiators, respectively.  Overall, dividend-initiating firms appear financially stronger than 
non-initiating firms, consistent with prior studies.  Specifically, dividend initiators are more 
profitable, as suggested by a higher average ROA of 5% versus that of -21% for the non-
initiators.  They are also better investment opportunities, as indicated by the average InvestOpp 
of 4.31 versus that of 2.25 for the non-initiators.  Dividend initiators are also bigger and more 
liquid when both the mean and standard deviations are considered.  Furthermore, these firms are 
relatively less leveraged with less volatile earnings.  The much narrower spans of minimum and 
maximum values for initiators offer another piece of evidence that they are relatively less risky 
than non-initiators.  Consequently, Panel A results are largely driven by non-initiators because 
they appear to produce extreme numbers.  
**Insert Table 1 here** 
Table 2(a) and 2(b) produce Pearson correlation analysis results for independent variables 
tested within the contemporaneous and expectation frameworks, respectively.  All variables 
show consistent relationships across both frameworks, indicating that the final samples are clean 
and free of significant impacts from missing values.  In addition, there is no sign of significant 
multicollinearity. 
**Insert Table 2(a) and 2(b) here** 
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Table 3(a) reports logit regression results under the contemporaneous framework.  We test 
four models to ensure that our results are robust to alternative model specifications.  Overall, the 
signaling hypothesis appears consistent with our test results.  We start with the base model (1) 
that incorporates fundamental financial characteristics of a firm.  The test results indicate that 
ROA and investment opportunity (InvestOpp) positively and significantly impact the likelihood 
of dividend initiation.  Based on the signaling hypothesis, firms would be more likely to initiate 
dividends when they are more profitable and see signs of stronger earnings power.  Model (2) 
controls for the impact of share repurchase and, consistent with theory, as an alternative to 
dividend share repurchase is found to be negatively correlated with dividend initiation.  Model (3) 
introduces DV Premium as the proxy to test for the catering hypothesis.  Results did not indicate 
significant impact on dividend initiation.  And lastly, further incorporating controls for the 
macro-economic environment, the Fama-French three factors, Model (4) produces similar results 
that show ROA and InvestOpp significantly and positively influence dividend initiation 
likelihood.  The dividend premium proxy (DV Premium) also shows a significant and negative 
impact on initiation, indicating that the impact direction is contrary to that posited in the catering 
hypothesis.  Overall, our results are consistent and robust.  ROA and InvestOpp are significantly 
and positively correlated with the likelihood of dividend initiation within our contemporaneous 
framework, suggesting the most prominent financial characteristics exhibited for dividend-
initiating restaurant firms.   
However, we are not ready to draw the conclusion that signaling appears to explain dividend 
initiation in the restaurant industry unless we also directly test and show that relevant 
relationships persist under our expectation framework.  We also report results from four logit 
models consistent with those under the contemporaneous framework in Table 3(b).  Overall, our 
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results are also consistent with those from the contemporaneous framework in support of the 
signaling hypothesis, with one extra piece of significant information – forward looking, liquidity 
significantly and positively influences the likelihood of dividend initiation.  All four models 
show positive and significant coefficients associated with ROA, InvestOpp, and Liquidity in year 
t+1.  Consequently, it appears that management makes its dividend initiation decision based on 
its expectation of future financial characteristic evolvements, echoing Cohen and Yagil (2010).  
When profitability and investment opportunities are expected to continue to be strong into the 
future, combined with liquidity increases, it is more likely to initiate dividends.  Dividend 
premiums do not appear to significantly affect dividend initiation under our expectation 
framework.   
**Insert Table 3(a) and 3(b) here** 
Sensitivity Tests 
 Two potential issues may influence our test results. 1). Our main test frameworks 
employed Fama and French (1993) three factors to control for overall macro-economic impacts; 
however, firm specific Fama and French (1993) three factor betas may be preferred because they 
are generally considered as direct measures of firm risks. 2). It appears that the clientele theory 
(Allen et al., 2000) may also play a role in driving restaurant firms’ dividend initiation.  Allen et 
al. (2000) postulate that institutional investors are more capable of assessing firm quality; 
consequently, higher-quality firms are willing to initiate dividend to attract these better informed 
investors. Lower-quality firms, on the other hand, are unwilling to imitate this action because 
they do not want to reveal their true type under the scrutiny of intuitional owners. The net result 
is that high quality firms are more likely to pay dividend to attract better informed institutional 
investors.   
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 To address 1), we use a firm’s daily returns from the CRSP and daily Fama-French 
factors from the Fama-French database on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) to estimate 
the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) on an annual basis.  The factor loadings are 
the Market Beta, HML Beta, and SMB Beta for individual firms in a given year. Then we merge 
the factor loadings data set with our final sample previously used to test the frameworks to arrive 
at our sensitivity test sample.  Merging causes our sensitivity test sample to shrink to 588 
observations for the contemporaneous framework and 563 observations for the expectation 
framework.  Results are reported in Table 4 with the contemporaneous framework in column 
Sensitivity 1 and the expectation framework in column Sensitivity 2. Overall, our results are 
robust.  
 To address 2), we estimate the deficit level of institutional ownership (DLIO) based on 
Kale et al., (2011); then we include DLIO in both of our test frameworks to see if our results are 
robust. The rationale behind lies in the assumption that institutions are informed investors, 
empirically, if a firm has a lower level of institutional ownership than it should be given the 
characteristics of the firm, it is more likely to initiate dividends (Allen et al., 2000).  In other 
words, Allen et al. (2000) predicts that the greater this deficit, the more likely is the firm to 
initiate dividends. We collect the institutional holdings data from Thomson Reuters Institutional 
(13f) Holdings - Type 3: Stock Holdings and the relevant financial data from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP. Then we merge this dataset with our final sample previously used to test both our 
frameworks. Merging causes the final sensitivity sample to shrink significantly for both 
frameworks—the contemporaneous framework sample drops to 223 observations and the 
expectation framework sample drops to 288 observations.  We estimated an OLS model 
following Kale et al., (2011) to obtain an estimate of DLIO. Then we include DLIO in both our 
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test frameworks—we also use Fama French three factors and factor betas separately—to test 
whether DLIO is significant. Our test results show that including DLIO in our test frameworks 
introduces high levels of multicollinearity, suggesting our existing frameworks have sufficiently 
accounted for the impact of DLIO (Test results are not reported due to space constraints). While 
acknowledging our data constraints, we argue that it appears when firms signal investors, the 
information in DLIO is embedded in the financial characteristics considered in our test 
frameworks.  In addition, we acknowledge our limitation in testing the tax theory due to data 
constraints and would like to suggest it as a future research direction in the restaurant industry.  
We did not find support for the residual and agency theories of dividends because our results 
show growth rates and ROA are positively related to dividend initiation, while capital 
expenditure is not. 
Discussion 
Among four hypotheses, hypothesis 1A is accepted.  The signaling hypothesis explains that 
dividend initiation is related to present and future profitability.  The life cycle hypothesis is not 
accepted because dividend initiation is positively related to present and future investment 
opportunities.  Free cash flow (hypothesis 3A) is not significant.  The dividend premium for 
catering theory (hypothesis 4A) is not accepted since it is negatively significant.   
The result can be interpreted as follows.  Most restaurant IPO firms begin to initiate 
dividends within two years after their IPOs like other industries (Kale et al. 2011).  Public 
offerings tell possible and current investors about a corporation’s growth stages, signaling 
opportunities for financing investment (Jain & Kini 1999).  This may be due to the larger number 
of franchising expansion opportunities in the restaurant industry rather than investments in fixed 
assets.  The growth stage is the time in which restaurant firms pay dividends.  Thus, restaurant 
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firms do not have much free cash flow (fewer agency problems) when restaurant firms initiate 
dividends.  Dividend initiation occurs when mature firms have positive market sentiment or 
dividend premiums (Bulan et al., 2007).  However, since most of our sample involves restaurants 
in the growth stage, it is possible that market sentiment may not impact dividend initiation.  For 
the expectation framework, dividend premium is insignificant.  For the contemporaneous model, 
it is negative. 
Conclusions and potential topics for future research 
Dividend initiation in the restaurant industry appears to be explained by the signaling 
hypothesis, which is consistent with previous hospitality studies.  Our other proposed research 
hypotheses (agency cost and life cycle) are not supported.  Our results do not support the 
catering theory explanation.  In the contemporaneous framework, financial characteristics of 
dividend initiators are high profitability, high investment opportunity, low stock repurchase, and 
low dividend premium.  For the expectation framework, variables such as ROA, investment 
opportunity, liquidity, and repurchase are significant.  While future repurchase is negatively 
related to present dividend initiation, other future variables are positively related to present 
dividend initiators.   
Although this study compared dividend initiation with stock repurchase in the restaurant 
industry, researchers have not looked at stock repurchase in the hospitality industry.  Some 
technology firms such as Cisco and Dell use large share repurchases without paying dividends 
(Skinner, 2008).  A firm’s motivation to engage in share repurchases is the amount of cash that 
they have on hand rather than potential investment or attempts to raise debt levels.  It would be 
worthwhile to research hospitality share repurchases. 
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This study’s focus was on dividend initiation.  It is clear that additional research on dividend 
omission and reduction would be interesting.  An international hospitality study on dividend 
policy would have a significant impact on the literature because more and more hospitality firms 
are becoming internationalized.  In this study, catering theory showed a relationship between 
dividend premium and shareholder sentiment.  Behavioral study on hospitality finance has not 
been popular, yet research on investor psychology would contribute to an understanding of some 
phenomena not explained by traditional finance.  This research found that the majority of 
restaurant IPOs became dividend initiators within a few years.  Since restaurant IPOs behave 
differently than other industry IPOs, another possible research topic would be a look at the life 
cycle of restaurant IPOs and ownership structures of restaurant IPOs. 
Limitations 
This study, constrained by data, did not address the lifecycle hypothesis. Ideally, we would 
also like to include the number of years after a restaurant has gone public before it begins 
dividend initiation. However, the majority of our sampled initiators paid dividends within the 
first three years after their IPOs, which suggests that the life cycle hypothesis may not be the 
reason that restaurant firms initiate dividends. Yet it is still necessary to test the life cycle 
hypothesis because restaurant firms could consider themselves mature once they go public and, 
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Figure 1: Dividend-initiating Years and Firm Numbers. 
 
Note: 
The final sample includes a total of 157 dividend initiations. 
Up and down arrows indicate peaks and troughs, respectively, of US business cycle determined by the Business 






Table 1: Dividend Initiators and Control Firms – Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Full Sample 
ROA -0.19 1.62 -47.23 1.65 
InvestOpp 2.42 17.53 -314.59 348.73 
Growth rate 0.63 7.44 -1.00 242.48 
Liquidity 1.44 3.52 0.00 82.83 
FCF 0.09 0.13 -0.08 1.00 
Size 3.34 1.95 -5.30 8.89 
Debt ratio 0.75 2.32 0.00 85.60 
Capex 0.15 0.15 -0.08 1.21 
ECV 1.26 31.89 -76.85 1,086.16 
Repurchase 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
DV Premium 0.35 0.97 -1.74 2.54 
Market 7.95 16.96 -39.94 32.12 
SMB  2.26 11.69 -25.62 27.73 
HML  5.90 14.83 -33.92 40.43 
Panel B: Non-initiating firms 
ROA -0.21 1.71 -47.23 1.65 
InvestOpp 2.25 18.05 -314.59 348.73 
Growth rate 0.66 7.72 -1.00 242.48 
Liquidity 1.46 3.68 0.00 82.83 
FCF 0.09 0.13 -0.08 1.00 
Size 3.30 1.95 -5.30 8.82 
Debt ratio 0.77 2.44 0.00 85.60 
Capex 0.16 0.15 -0.08 1.21 
ECV 1.31 33.21 -76.85 1086.16 
Repurchase 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
DV Premium 0.35 0.98 -1.74 2.54 
Market 7.76 17.01 -39.94 32.12 
SMB  2.09 11.74 -25.62 27.73 
HML  5.88 14.94 -33.92 40.43 
Panel C: Initiating firms 
ROA 0.05 0.15 -0.45 0.55 
InvestOpp 4.31 9.75 -2.49 84.42 
Growth rate 0.21 0.61 -0.80 4.89 
Liquidity 1.27 1.44 0.06 14.68 
FCF 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.66 
Size 3.75 1.90 -0.05 8.89 
Debt ratio 0.61 0.30 0.00 2.60 
Capex 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.77 
ECV 0.75 6.98 -18.68 69.19 
Repurchase 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
DV Premium 0.35 0.93 -1.74 2.54 
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Market  10.06 16.26 -39.94 32.12 
SMB  4.11 11.00 -25.62 27.73 
HML  6.13 13.69 -33.92 40.43 
Note: 
The summary statistics is based on the dividend-initiating year to provide an overview of financial characteristics of 
dividend initiators and non-initiators. Return on Assets (ROA) = ni/at, net income divided by total assets; 
Investment Opportunity (InvestOpp) = (csho*prcc_f)/seq, common shares outstanding*share price at the end of a 
fiscal year over book value of total equity; Growth Rate (Growth rate) = (revtt-revtt-1)/revtt-1, the relative change of 
total sales from time t-1 to t). Liquidity (Liquidity) = act/lct, current assets divided by current liabilities; Free Cash 
Flow (FCF) = ch/at, cash divided by total assets; Size (Size)=ln(at), natural logarithm of total assets; Debt Ratio 
(Debt ratio) = lt/at, total liabilities divided by total assets; Capital Expenditure (Capex) = capx/at, capital expenditure 
divided by total assets; Earnings Coefficient of Variation (ECV) = the standard deviation of niq/the mean of niq, 
coefficient of variation of quarterly net income; Stock Repurchase (Repurchase) = 1, if there is an increase in 
treasury stock, 0, otherwise; Dividend Premium (DV Premium) = the logs of the average market-to-book ratios of 
dividend payers and non-payers, following Baker and Wurgler (2004); Fama-French three factors (Market, SMB, 
HML beta) are from the Fama-Frech data library website; Dividend Initiation (DV Initiation) = 1, if a firm initiates 
cash dividend payment after a firm’s initial public offering in a given year, 0, otherwise. 
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Table 2(a): Pearson Correlation Analysis for Independent Variables within the Contemporary Framework. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
DV Initiation (1) 1               
               
ROA (2) 0.0532 1               
(.0432)                
InvestOpp (3) 0.0475 0.0011 1              
(.1171) (.9723)               
Growth rate (4) -0.0169 -0.0462 -0.0097 1             
(.5577) (.1079) (.7573)              
Liquidity (5) -0.0154 0.0255 0.0157 0.0077 1            
(.5625) (.3377) (.6062) (.7925)             
FCF (6) -0.014 -0.0589 0.0306 0.0099 0.2566 1           




0.0846 0.2405 -0.056 -0.0405 -0.0561 -0.2261 1          




-0.0231 -0.2113 -0.0242 0.0087 -0.0561 0.1925 -0.2019 1         




-0.0195 0.0178 0.086 0.0199 -0.0138 -0.0312 -0.0996 -0.082 1        




-0.0059 0.0104 0.0014 -0.0047 -0.006 -0.0102 -0.0031 0.0037 -0.0083 1       




-0.0366 0.0421 -0.031 -0.0025 -0.0308 -0.0355 0.2083 -0.0322 0.0098 0.0015 1      
(.1282) (.1098) (.3063) (.9307) (.2467) (.1922) (.0000) (.2212) (.7126) (.9562)       
DV Premium (12) -0.0012 0.0161 -0.0173 -0.0076 0.0042 0.0318 0.1142 0.0241 -0.1012 -0.0217 0.046 1     
(.9641) (.5706) (.5969) (.8063) (.8831) (.2755) (.0000) (.3931) (.0004) (.4522) (.0752)      
Mkt_rf (13) 0.0412 -0.0253 0.0198 -0.0605 0.0014 -0.0026 0.01 -0.0427 0.0024 0.0129 0.0154 0.0587 1    
(.0863) (.3367) (.5126) (.0351) (.9574) (.9231) (.7046) (.1043) (.9292) (.6352) (.5230) (.0231)     
SMB (14) 0.0483 -0.0133 -0.0224 -0.0027 -0.0161 0.0041 -0.0302 0.0425 -0.0418 0.0046 -0.0564 0.0757 0.1064 1   
(.0443) (.6127) (.4604) (.9239) (.5449) (.8805) (.2506) (.1058) (.1150) (.8662) (.0189) (.0034) (.0000)    
HML (15) 0.0063 0.0601 -0.0533 0.0211 0.0381 0.0289 -0.0231 0.0207 0.0006 0.0324 -0.048 0.1704 -0.3674 0.0661 1 
(.7946) (.0224) (.0781) (.4635) (.1515) (.2888) (.3793) (.4317) (.9818) (.2316) (.0457) (.0000) (.0000) (.0059)   
Notes: 
P-values appear in the parentheses.  DV Initiation = 1, if a firm initiates cash dividend payment after a firm’s initial public offering in a given year; 0, otherwise. 
Return on Assets (ROA) = ni/at, net income divided by total assets; Investment Opportunity (InvestOpp) = (csho*prcc_f)/seq, common shares outstanding*share 
price at the end of a fiscal year over book value of total equity; Growth Rate (Growth rate) = (revtt-revtt-1)/revtt-1, the relative change of total sales from time t-1 
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to t). Liquidity (Liquidity) = act/lct, current assets divided by current liabilities; Free Cash Flow (FCF) = ch/at, cash divided by total assets; Size (Size)=ln(at), 
natural logarithm of total assets; Debt Ratio (Debt ratio) = lt/at, total liabilities divided by total assets; Capital Expenditure (Capex) = capx/at, capital expenditure 
divided by total assets; Earnings Coefficient of Variation (ECV) = the standard deviation of niq/the mean of niq, coefficient of variation of quarterly net income; 
Stock Repurchase (Repurchase) = 1, if there is an increase in treasury stock, 0, otherwise; Dividend Premium (DV Premium) = the logs of the average market-to-
book ratios of dividend payers and non-payers, following Baker and Wurgler (2004); Fama-French three factor betas  (Market, SMB, HML) are from the Fama-






Table 2(b): Pearson Correlation Analysis for Independent Variables within the Expectation Framework 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
DV Initiation (1) 1               
               
ROAt+1 (2) 0.0471 1               
(.0847)                
InvestOpp
 t+1 (3) 0.0743 0.023 1              
(.0141) (.4485)               
Growth rate
 t+1 (4) -0.0119 -0.0463 -0.0056 1             
(.6733) (.1006) (.8570)              
Liquidity
 t+1 (5) 0.0221 0.0324 0.0082 0.0225 1            
(.4219) (.2400) (.7872) (.4304)             
FCF
 t+1 (6) 0.0284 -0.0527 0.0156 0.0118 0.1749 1           
(.3155) (.0625) (.6215) (.6874) (.0000)            
Size
 t+1 (7)  0.1071 0.2544 -0.0288 -0.043 -0.0459 -0.2014 1          
(.0001) (.0000) (.3412) (.1277) (.0958) (.0000)           
Debt ratio
 t+1 (8)  -0.0311 -0.2184 -0.0191 0.0075 -0.0595 0.2075 -0.2197 1         
(.2545) (.0000) (.5290) (.7899) (.0306) (.0000) (.0000)          
Capex
 t+1 (9)  0.0159 0.0416 0.0461 0.017 -0.0007 -0.0174 -0.055 -0.0872 1        
(.5633) (.1299) (.1296) (.5504) (.9805) (.5430) (.0454) (.0015)         
ECV
 t+1 (10)  -0.0118 0.0099 -0.0009 -0.0046 -0.0065 -0.0108 -0.0042 0.0038 -0.009 1       
(.6695) (.7313) (.9772) (.8762) (.8231) (.7184) (.8839) (.8942) (.7582)        
Repurchase
 t+1 (11)  -0.0274 0.0461 -0.0266 -0.0029 -0.0278 -0.0254 0.2151 -0.0336 0.0185 0.0022 1      
(.2776) (.0911) (.3796) (.9190) (.3132) (.3684) (.0000) (.2178) (.5001) (.9376)       
DV Premium
 t+1 (12) -0.0217 0.0063 -0.0243 -0.0093 0.0021 0.0309 0.0899 0.0241 -0.1168 -0.0256 0.0257 1     
(.4235) (.8314) (.4588) (.7585) (.9442) (.3095) (.0021) (.4106) (.0001) (.3842) (.3434)      
Mkt_rf
 t+1 (13) 0.0245 -0.0232 0.0323 -0.0558 0.0115 0.0254 -0.0361 -0.0476 0.0106 0.0124 0.0049 0.0239 1    
(.3304) (.3953) (.2862) (.0478) (.6762) (.3691) (.1854) (.0808) (.7010) (.6530) (.8459) (.3785)     
SMB
 t+1 (14) -0.0123 -0.0081 -0.0329 -0.0021 -0.0444 -0.0063 -0.053 0.0445 -0.0542 0.0056 -0.0662 0.0724 0.0701 1   
(.6269) (.7681) (.2774) (.9412) (.1065) (.8251) (.0518) (.1028) (.0485) (.8395) (.0086) (.0075) (.0053)    
HML
 t+1 (15) 0.0218 0.0466 -0.0258 0.0216 0.0173 0.0204 -0.0415 0.0235 -0.0077 0.0296 -0.0468 0.1763 -0.372 0.0841 1 
(.3877) (.0878) (.3949) (.4447) (.5294) (.4715) (.1274) (.3896) (.7807) (.2841) (.0631) (.0000) (.0000) (.0008)   
Note: 
Variables are defined as in Table 2(a) except that in the expectation framework they are from the year following the dividend initiating year. 
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Table 3(a): Logit Regression Results in the Contemporary Framework. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DV Initiation DV Initiation DV Initiation DV Initiation 
     
ROA
 
1.865* 1.878* 1.887* 1.804* 
 (0.746) (0.749) (0.772) (0.762) 
InvestOpp
 
0.0427** 0.0415** 0.0430** 0.0461** 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0153) 
Growth rate
 
 -0.0702 -0.0723 -0.0486 -0.0418 
 (0.155) (0.179) (0.137) (0.127) 
Liquidity 0.136+ 0.123 0.120 0.102 
 (0.0820) (0.0835) (0.0848) (0.0858) 
FCF
 
 -0.529 -0.419 -0.864 -0.753 
 (1.422) (1.422) (1.568) (1.545) 
Size
 
 0.0891 0.120 0.127 0.118 
 (0.0836) (0.0865) (0.0890) (0.0903) 
Debt ratio
 
 0.109 0.106 -0.0389 -0.0800 
 (0.377) (0.378) (0.465) (0.476) 
Capex
 
 -1.480 -1.320 -1.350 -1.249 
 (1.279) (1.297) (1.328) (1.330) 
ECV
 
 -0.000939 -0.00105 -0.00141 -0.00180 
 (0.00476) (0.00482) (0.00514) (0.00501) 
Repurchase
 
  -0.804+ -0.896+ -0.856+ 
  (0.450) (0.488) (0.491) 
DV Premium   -0.213 -0.325* 
   (0.140) (0.155) 
Market     0.00597 
    (0.0101) 
SMB    0.0209+ 
    (0.0124) 
HML    0.0157 
    (0.0113) 
_cons -2.901*** -2.926*** -2.659*** -2.787*** 
 (0.542) (0.546) (0.589) (0.617) 
N 874 874 753 753 
1LR Chi2 26.13 29.93 30.74 35.74 
Prob. > LR Chi2 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
1: degrees of freedom for the LR chi2 of the model (1), (2), (3), and (4) are 9, 10, 11, and 14, respectively. 
We use the dividend-initiating year to estimate the logit regressions with DV Initiation as the dependent variable, 
coded as one if a firm initiates the dividend in a given year or zero otherwise. Independent variables are described in 






Table 3(b): Logit Regression Results in the Expectation Framework. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DV Initiation DV Initiation DV Initiation DV Initiation 
     
ROAt+1 1.778** 1.821** 1.934** 1.984** 
 (0.646) (0.651) (0.699) (0.707) 
InvestOppt+1 0.0306* 0.0302* 0.0393* 0.0386* 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0176) (0.0178) 
Growth rate
 t+1 -0.00519 -0.00380 -0.00261 -0.00230 
 (0.0292) (0.0264) (0.0241) (0.0242) 
Liquidityt+1 0.192** 0.182** 0.186** 0.190** 
 (0.0628) (0.0630) (0.0648) (0.0656) 
FCF
 t+1 0.470 0.555 0.402 0.392 
 (1.009) (1.008) (1.098) (1.103) 
Size
 t+1 0.0760 0.0968 0.0873 0.0880 
 (0.0751) (0.0771) (0.0826) (0.0824) 
Debt ratio
 t+1 0.273 0.277 0.302 0.312 
 (0.252) (0.252) (0.253) (0.256) 
Capex
 t+1 0.948 1.026 1.179 1.169 
 (0.889) (0.895) (0.933) (0.940) 
ECV
 t+1 -0.00419 -0.00441 -0.0104 -0.0107 
 (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0141) (0.0143) 
Repurchase
 t+1  -0.524 -0.722+ -0.740+ 
  (0.346) (0.395) (0.396) 
DV Premiumt+1   -0.00648 0.0268 
   (0.122) (0.128) 
Markett+1     0.00102 
    (0.00897) 
SMBt+1    -0.00759 
    (0.0103) 
HMLt+1    -0.00482 
    (0.0105) 
_cons -3.111*** -3.119*** -3.082*** -3.089*** 
 (0.462) (0.465) (0.496) (0.511) 
N 900 900 773 773 
1LR Chi2 37.07 39.60 40.03 40.88 
Prob. > LR Chi2 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
1: degrees of freedom for the LR chi2 of the model (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) are 9, 10, 11, and 14, respectively. 
We include the dividend-initiating year and the year following to estimate the logit regressions with DV Initiator as 
the dependent variable, coded as one if a firm initiates the dividend in a given year or zero otherwise. Independent 
variables are described in Tables 2 and 3 and discussed in detail in the methodology section.  But in an expectation 
framework, we take advantage of ex post data available in COMPUSTAT and assume parties of interest will have 
reasonably accurate expectation about what will happen one year ahead. In other words, for example, ROAt+1 
indicates that return on assets in the year following the dividend-initiating year is reasonably well expected and 
known in the year of dividend initiation. Our results are not sensitive to excluding the dividend-initiating firm year 
observations from the year after the dividend-initiating year.  
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Table 4: Sensitivity Test Results 
 (Sensitivity 1)  (Sensitivity 2) 
 DV Initiation  DV Initiation 
    
ROA 2.066 ROAt+1 5.257*** 
 (1.608)  (1.498) 
InvestOpp 0.126* InvestOppt+1 0.130** 
 (0.0645)  (0.0457) 
Growth rate
 
 -0.505 Growth rate
 t+1 0.0349 
 (0.479)  (0.0505) 
Liquidity 0.190+ Liquidityt+1 0.271** 




 t+1 0.527 




 t+1 -0.196 
 (0.154)  (0.125) 
Debt ratio
 
 -0.183 Debt ratio
 t+1 1.328* 




 t+1 0.335 




 t+1 -0.0174 




 t+1 -0.842+ 
 (0.577)  (0.506) 
DV Premium 0.0620 DV Premiumt+1 0.0973 
 (0.224)  (0.170) 
Market Beta -0.0294 Market Betat+1  -0.0634 
 (0.263)  (0.219) 
SMB Beta -0.359+ SMB Betat+1 0.276+ 
 (0.194)  (0.161) 
HML Beta 0.333** HML Betat+1 -0.0347 
 (0.128)  (0.137) 
_cons -3.501*** _cons -3.247*** 
 (0.877)  (0.725) 
N 588  563 
LR Chi2(14) 23.29  50.15 
Prob. > LR Chi2 .05  .00 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Degrees of freedom for the LR chi2 are reported in parentheses as (14). 
Variables are described in Tables 1 and 2 except that Fama French three factor loadings are Market Beta, SMB Beta 
and HML Beta, respectively. We use a firm’s daily returns from the CRSP and daily Fama-French factors from the 
Fama-French database on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) to estimate the three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993) on an annual basis.  The factor loadings are the Market Beta, HML Beta, and SMB Beta for 
individual firms in a given year.   
